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Migration and Regional Convergence in the European Union 
1.  Introduction 
 
European  migration  trends  in  the  last  decade  have  been  marked  by  a  number  of 
spectacular changes. In particular, in the course of the recent enlargement immigration 
to some EU15 countries from the EU10 has become remarkable
1. Immigration to the UK 
is estimated to have accounted for some 560 ,000 persons in 2004-2006 (Lemos and 
Portes 2008) and a number of the EU15 countries, which still were emigration countries 
in the beginning of the 19 90’s  such  as  Spain  or  Ireland  also  received  substantial 
immigration  from  the  EU10.
2  Similarly  -  although  EU15 countries have clearly much 
higher immigration rates, - the new Eastern European member states  had become net 
immigration countries  on account of  high inflows of migrants in particular form former 
Soviet Union countries (see OECD,2007).  Nevertheless, the Central Eastern European 
as well as Baltic countries had then started to send continuously migrants to the EU15. 
At the current point in time the v ast majority of the EU27 countries are net immigration 
countries. 
 
At the same time,  since  enlargement 2004/07 the EU  has to face a major cohesion 
problem,  manifesting  itself  in  substantial  income  and  unemployment  differences . 
However, over  the last decade we can observe a decline in regional disparities both in 
per capita income as well as unemployment. Most  dramatic is the decline in regional 
unemployment disparities which – after an increase during the economic stagnation of 
2001/02 – declined substantially. 
 
In the face of important migration flows and the cohesion problem, the question arises 
whether migration had an effect on unemployment and GDP per capita levels in the 
2000s. This question is not easy to answer. From the point of view of economic theory 
migration  may  produce  transitory  employment  and  wage  effects  in  highly  developed 
open  economies  but  no  long  run  effects.  In  closed  economies  with  rigid  sectoral 
specializations also long run adverse effects are possible. However, a number of other 
factors (such as the structure of migrant flows in terms of human capital, the elasticities 
of substitution between natives and migrants of potentially different ages and human 
capital endowments, the price elasticity of labour demand, the speed of adjustment of 
the capital stock and the reaction of national wage setting institutions and many more) 
have been shown to have an impact on the sign of the long run as well as the short run 
effects of migration on labour markets and GDP per capita (see Borjas 2003, Ottaviano 
and Peri 2006 and Bentolila et al 2008, for recent discussions of the impact of some of 
these variables). 
 
The question of the effects of migration on the labour market and GDP per capita is thus 
essentially an empirical one, with the empirical literature on employment and income 
effects of migration (which in contrast to numerous studies covering immigration effects 
                                                 
1 Henceforth we will use EU10 for the Central and Eastern European countries acceding to the 
EU in 2004/07, EU 12 for all new member states 2004/07 and EU15 for countries that were EU 
member states already before 2004.  
2 Both countries, however, became immigration countries already in the mid 1990s. Nevertheless 
for Spain Bentolila et al (2008) show that the share of foreign born in the total labour force 
increased from below 0.5% in 1995 to 14%   in 2006. For Ireland Hughes (2007) reports an 
increase of net migration from around 32.000 persons (up from 8.000 in 1996) just before the 
enlargement in 2004 to about 70.000 persons in the first half of 2006. Barrett (2009) reports 
120.000 resident persons from EU10 in total in Ireland in 2006.  2 
 
in the US is not too rich for Europe) following a number of different strands. One of these 
makes projections on the effects of migration on employment and output in simulations 
with  Computable  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  Models.  These  simulations  assume 
competition between migrants and native labour, distinguish between skill groups, know 
mobility between skill groups as a reaction to immigration, permit a change in sector 
composition and include demand effects from the larger household sector including the 
migrants. Those models project small unemployment and wage effects, which can be 
balanced by demand effects (see: Boeri and Brücker 2005, D´Amuri et al 2010,Barrell et 
al 2010  for examples). 
 
The second type of literature draws on empirically observed developments in migration, 
employment  and  wage  changes  and  (econometrically)  estimates  the  statistical 
relationships  between  migration  and  unemployment,  wages  or  output  growth.  The 
country studies that have been produced in this literature mostly use individual labour 
market data and look either at the regional or micro-economic level and often distinguish 
between skill and age groups. Analyses with the available data incur some problematic 
points which have been systematically discussed but only partly solved in the literature. 
These studies often come to the conclusion that immigration has no or only a very small 
significant effect on unemployment, but affects output growth positively.  
 
The third type of study (recently surveyed by Etzo, 2008), focuses on convergence in 
terms of GDP per capita and follows the results of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). In a 
recent meta-study, Ozgen et al (2010) point out that these studies typically find that the 
effect of net migration on per capita income growth is positive, but small.  
 
All these studies focus on particular countries and/or specific labour market segments. 
However, there is very little literature which assesses the effects of migration from a 
general  European  perspective,  particularly  when  it  comes  to  analysing the  impact of 
migration  on  the  declared  policy  objectives  of  the  EU  (such  as  cohesion  and 
competitiveness), which thus leaves European policy makers ill prepared to assess how 
policies  on    labour  mobility  in  the  EU  impact  on  these  policy  objectives.  This  study 
therefore offers an empirical, econometric analysis covering the EU27’s NUTS2 regions 
in the 2000-2007 period.  
 
First,  we  analyse  to  which  extent  migration  affects  unemployment,  GDP  per  capita 
growth  and  productivity  growth  which  we  consider  a  “catch  all”  indicator  for 
competitiveness of a region. In addition, in the case of regional unemployment we also 
distinguish between youth and long-term unemployment. Second we estimate the effects 
of  migration  in  the  case  of  immigration  and  emigration  regions.  Third,  although  the 
limited data availability does not permit to estimate the effects by different skill groups or 
different countries of origin of migrants (e.g. from other EU countries vs. the rest of the 
world) we highlight the pattern of migration by education group and country of origin in 
our descriptive analysis. 
 
We use data from the Eurostat Regio Database and the European Labour Force Survey 
(ELFS). These data sets are the best available sources and an essential basis for a 
regional migration analysis for EU countries. Nevertheless they have certain limits which 
we will have to consider carefully and which restrict the issues that we can analyze. 
Unfortunately, we only have information on the migrant population rather than on migrant 
labour and poor information on migrants’ country of origin and destination as well as on 
their skills. Despite these limitations we think it is important to go beyond the existing 
country level analysis and assess the impacts of migration from a European perspective. 3 
 
Furthermore,  we  attempt  to  account  for  the  estimation  problems  described  in  the 
literature in our specification and employ instrumental variables estimators to account for 
the endogeneity of migration. 
 
In  accordance  with  the  literature  we  find  no  significant  impact  of  migration  on 
unemployment and youth unemployment, but a significant but small effect of migration 
on  long-term  unemployment.  Migration,  however,  has  a  positive  effect  on  GDP  per 
capita growth as well as on productivity growth. Immigration regions experience a 0.03 
per cent increase in GDP per capita and a 0.01 per cent increase in productivity when 
the net immigration rate increases by 1 per cent. Emigration regions loose 0.02 per cent 
of  GDP  per  capita  and  0.03  per  cent  of  productivity  by  a  1  per  cent  increase  in 
emigration. Thus we conclude that migration, since influencing productivity,  evidently 
changes the structure of skills. It therefore has a positive effect on the competitiveness of 
–  generally  richer  -  immigration  regions  but  a  negative  one  on  emigration  regions. 
Migration therefore does not promote income convergence. 
 
The rest of this study is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the theoretical 
effects of migration and review the results of the empirical literature. Section 3 discusses 
data issues. Section 4 shows some empirical facts. Section 5 presents our specification 
and Section 6 the results of our estimations. Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  Migration in theory and in the empirical literature 
 
2.1 Migration effects: Unemployment and Wages 
 
Migration is popularly considered to result in wage pressures and in the absence of 
wage flexibility in increased unemployment. Economic theory proposes a more thorough 
argument. Here immigration is assumed to comprise different skill groups. It changes the 
overall labour supply and if representing a particular skill group, the skill structure in the 
destination (and sending) region. If capital is fixed immigration to an economy with a 
small product range and little exposure to world trade will lead to long run employment 
and wage effects, whereas open economies with a rich product mix should not see such 
long  run  effects  (Borjas  1999,  Card  2001).  Since  the  first  type  of  economy  has  no 
flexibility to change its output mix, immigration affecting the skill structure will lead to 
long-term  wage  effects.  In  contrast,  the  multi  product,  open  economy  can  adjust  its 
product structure. An industry which uses a specific skill intensively will face lower wage 
costs if immigration occurs in that skill group. At given world prices, this industry will 
become more profitable, attracting more firms until the original wage level is restored. 
Leamer  and  Levinsohn  (1995)  call  this  “long  run  factor  price  insensitivity”  of  open 
economies to immigration. Nevertheless, in the short run, wages in skill groups which 
experience  an  inflow  of  additional  labour  due  to  immigration  may  be  depressed. 
Production of goods using this skill type will become more profitable and expand output 
(Dustmann et al 2005 and Dustmann et al 2008).  
 
Dustmann et al (2008) argue further that with no sectoral flexibility and if immigration 
concentrates  for  example  on  unskilled  labour  this  skill  segment  will  become  more 
abundant which will lead to a falling  wage rate in that labour market segment (or, if 
wages do not adjust fully to increased unemployment), whereas skilled labour becomes 
scarce relative to unskilled labour, which may lead to increasing wages if high and low 
skilled labour are complementary in production.  
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If, by contrast capital is mobile, in the short run, migration reduces the capital to labour 
ratio and thus makes labour less productive. However, since wage costs are lower, the 
return to capital increases. This increased profitability attracts international capital flows 
in  open  economies  or  increased  internal  investments  in  closed  economies,  which 
restores  the  capital  to  labour  ratio  and  thus  the  productivity.  As  labour  and  capital 
endowments have increased, the economy has settled on a higher output level (see: 
Barrell et al 2010). Ottaviano and Peri (2006) estimate that capital mobility is sufficient to 
restore 10 per cent of the original capital to labour ratio each year.  
 
Dustmann et  al (2008) argue that immigration of a particular  skill group used by an 
industry may also lead to the change in the employed technology in that industry as a 
reaction to the excess supply.  An increase of unskilled workers might thus promote the 
use of labour intensive production methods, for example agriculture may produce more 
labour intensive crops if unskilled labour is plentiful. Referring to the literature Dustmann 
et al (2008) state that about two thirds of labour market adjustments are affected by 
technological change.  
 
In summary, theory does not propose a single outcome of migration. Unemployment and 
wage effects may but must not occur; they can be both transitive as well as permanent. 
(Migration should however result in additional output as we will discuss in section 2.2).  
 
There  is  a  considerable  empirical  literature  which  attempts  to  assess  the  effects  of 
migration on unemployment. A part of these studies simulate the effects of potential 
migration  in macroeconomic  and general  equilibrium models to  see  how  a  migration 
shock  works  through  the  economy  and  to  make  projections  on  the  effects  on 
employment,  wages  and  output.  Another  strand  of  literature  estimates  the  effects  of 
observed  migration  trends  with  econometric  techniques.  The  issues  at  interest  are 
whether migration has reduced wages and increased unemployment.  
 
The potential high migration flows from the EU10 to the EU15 countries generated a 
number of studies simulating the macroeconomic effects of migration in CGE models. 
Boeri and Brücker (2005) proposed that an emigration of 3 per cent of Eastern European 
citizens to the EU15 would increase the GDP of the EU15 by 0.5 per cent. However, 
they admit that due to rigid labour markets in the West, unemployment could rise. Barell 
et al (2010) simulated the effects of EU12 immigration into the UK and Ireland and argue 
that  unemployment  might  rise  temporarily.  Hofer  (2008)  simulated  the  effects  of 
migration on the Austrian economy and concluded that migration would increase GDP, 
whereas wages and unemployment were only marginally affected.   
 
Given  that  the  post  2004  migration  from  the  EU10  focused  on  the  UK  and  Ireland 
resulting in a significant labour supply shock of 265,000 persons in the UK and 62,000 in 
Ireland between 2004-2006,
3 Barrell et al (2010) estimated the macroeconomic effects of 
these shocks in the general  equilibrium model NiGEM. Without distinguishing between 
the skill levels of migrants, they project that emigration from the EU12 reduces their 
output by 1 per cent and their unemployment by 0.8 percentage points. The immigration 
shock would increase output in the UK and Ireland by 0.6 and 1.7 per cent respectively. 
Since capital adjustment requires some time, in the short run, immigration increases 
unemployment temporarily by 1 and 0.25 percentage points in the UK and Ireland 
respectively, and reduces wages. 
                                                 
3 Dependent on different data bases, other sources report a significantly higher number, namely 
560,000 in the UK and 120,000 in Ireland (Lemos and Portes 2008 and Barrett 2009).  5 
 
 
Barrett (2009) simulated the macroeconomic effects of EU10 immigration to Ireland in a 
model  which  considers  competitiveness  on  international  markets  as  an  essential 
requirement for a small open economy. He argues that the immigration of 180 thousand 
persons induced a fall in wages by 7.8 per cent and has thus permitted to maintain 
Irelands  high  growth  performance  at  the  time  of  immigration.  He  proposes  that 
immigration led to an increase of GNP by an amazing 6 per cent.  
 
Baas  and  Brücker  (2010)  assess  the  effects  of  immigration  from  the  EU10  on  the 
German and UK economy. Due to imposed labour market restrictions, in the two years 
following the 2004 enlargement, Germany experienced an increase of EU10 population 
by 82,000 persons while the UK experienced an increase by 265,000 (Barrell et al 2010). 
Baas and Brücker (2010) use a CGE model to assess the impact of trade, capital and 
migration flows triggered by enlargement simultaneously. Labour market imperfections 
are  captured  by  a  negative  relationship  between  the  real  wage  level  and  the 
unemployment rate, with the wage elasticity slightly higher in the UK than in Germany. 
The simulations suggest a 1 per cent increase of GDP associated with EU enlargement 
in both countries. However, while the increase is trade driven in Germany it is largely 
immigration  driven  in  the  UK.  Germany  would  thus  have  benefited  even  more  from 
enlargement if it had lifted labour market restrictions.  
 
Other  studies  making  projections  on  the  basis  of  more  complex  structural  models 
propose that the effect of migration depends on the skill level. D´Amuri et al (2010) start 
from a labour market model and estimate the effect of immigration into Germany in the 
1990s. They conclude that the recent immigration had hardly any wage and employment 
effects on native Germans, but has lead to important cuts in employment of previous 
immigrants.  Similarly,  Felbermayr  et  al  (2009)  estimate  a  structural  model  of  labour 
demand accounting for different skill levels and simulate the scenario of work restrictions 
vs their abolishment. As D´Amuri et al (2010), they find that immigration had negative 
wage and employment effects on incumbent foreigners but not on German nationals.   
 
In contrast to model simulations, econometric studies based on actual developments in 
the data mostly fail to find any significant impact of migration on unemployment. Longhi 
et al (2006) review this empirical literature. They conclude that on average a 1 per cent 
increase of immigration reduces employment by a negligible 0.02 per cent, the impact on 
existing migrants being slightly higher. In Europe the effect on employment is higher, in 
the US this applies to the effect on wages.  
 
Estimating  the  unemployment  effects  of  immigration  in  OECD  countries,  Jean  and 
Jiménez (2007) showed that they reveal time varying effects as well as depending on 
labour and product market policies of the receiving country. They found no permanent 
but only transitory adverse effects on unemployment. Rigid labour market policies and 
anti-competitive product market policies increase the duration of unemployment. Angrist 
and Kugler (2001) analyse whether restrictive labour market regulations (employment 
protection,  work  hour  restrictions,  minimum  wages)  have  an  impact  on  the 
unemployment effects of immigration for Western European countries. They find higher 
negative unemployment effects when employing instrumental variables (IV) estimation. A 
10 per cent increase in the share of foreign workers would reduce native employment by 
0.2-0.7  percentage  points,  with  protective  labour  market  regulations  worsening  the 
effects.   
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Due to the long experience of immigration and the recent wave of migrants from the EU-
10, immigration into the UK has been one of the most assessed movements in recent 
years. In particular Dustmann et al (2005) is among the first studies to analyse wage and 
employment effects of immigration in the UK. They use census data and regional LFS 
data, covering the period from the 1970s to 1990s and point out that in order to analyse 
the effects of migration one should use data on unemployment and wage development in 
the  native  labour  segment  rather  than  of  total labour,  since  total  unemployment  and 
wage would cover unemployment/wage changes in the immigrant labour force as well. 
Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  to  account  for  internal  migration  to  capture  possible 
relocation of native labour. The authors also emphasize that results will differ according 
to the estimator employed, whether using levels or differences and the included control 
variables. They demonstrate that estimation with the appropriate fixed effects and IV to 
account  for  endogeneity  of  migration  (low  unemployment  /high  wage  regions  attract 
immigration)  yields  an  insignificant  coefficient  of  migration  on  unemployment.  The 
authors  investigate  the  unemployment  effect  of  immigration  in  different  subsamples 
divided by skills, gender, or age group. A small adverse effect on unemployment in the 
UK can only be found with semi-skilled workers and in the older age group above 50.  
 
Portes  and  Lemos (2008)  focus  on  the  immigration from the  EU10  into  the  UK  and 
estimate  the  effects  on  unemployment  and  wages. They  use monthly  micro  data  on 
district  level  from  the  Worker  Registration  Scheme  which  provides  information  on 
nationality, age, sex, occupation, wage and industry sector. They point out that the key 
issue,  is  to  identify  which  labour  segments  are  competed  by  migrants.  Further,  they 
argue that estimations need to look at the correct regional aggregation level in order to 
assure  closed  labour  markets.  Thus  they  perform  their  estimations  for  different 
occupational  groups  and  at  different  regional  aggregation  levels.  Portes  and  Lemos 
(2008) argue that EU10 immigration to the UK concentrated on a few, closed labour 
markets (London  and  South  East)  where  no  increasing  outflow  of  native  labour  was 
observed.  Immigrants  compete  with  low  wage  workers.  Other  regions  which  were 
practically  left  out  by  migration  are  taken  as  control  groups.  The  authors  regress 
changes  in  unemployment  rate  on  migration  and  a  number  of  controls  and  find  no 
significant coefficient of migration, irrespective of the regional aggregation level. They 
further  estimate  the  impact  of  immigration  on  low  skilled,  female  and  youth 
unemployment. They find no significant impact on the first two groups. They, however, 
find an increase of youth unemployment at the regional level by 0.10 percentage points 
arising from 1 per cent increase in migration rate.
4 Estimating the migration impact in 
different occupational groups again gives no evidence of significant unemployment 
effects.   
 
Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) use data from the LFS and other sources and 
primarily investigate the motive s of EU10 migrants to move to the UK. Performing a 
battery of correlations in the data they show that the post 2004 immigrants from EU10 in 
the UK were typically in low skilled jobs and paid 8 per cent lower wages  than natives. 
Fear of unemployment among competing, low skilled native workers led to a decline in 
wages in this labour segment. They suggest that recent immigration into the UK brought 
complementary workers, not substitutes, with a high work ethnic that raised productivity. 
Consequently, according to their results immigration from the EU10 has reduced  both 
the natural rate of unemployment  as well as  inflationary pressures.  Drinkwater et al 
                                                 
4 Similar results are  obtained by Riley  and Weale (2006)  who also find an increase in  youth 
unemployment for the UK. 7 
 
(2006) and Barrett et al (2006) point out that EU10 immigrants into the UK and Ireland 
became employed in low skilled jobs, despite a relatively high skill level.  
 
Bonin (2005) starts from the suggestion of Borjas (2003) to look at skill groups to assure 
closed labour markets. He defines skill groups by education and work experience, when 
assessing  the  immigration  effects  and  analysis  the  1975-1997  IAB  employment 
subsample for Germany. After an important immigration in the 1970s and a drop in the 
1980s, immigration has sharply increased in Germany since the beginning of the 1990s.  
Unlike Borjas (2003) who concluded that immigration into  the US had worsened the 
labour market opportunities of workers in the same skill group, Bonin (2005) finds that an 
increase  in foreign  workforce  does  not  increase  unemployment.  However,  it  reduces 
wages by 10 per cent. The effects are stronger for low educated labour and short and 
very long work experience.  
 
In sum, while there is substantial and in part conflicting country evidence of the effects of 
migration on unemployment and wages, to date there is only very little literature that 
focuses on this issue from a European perspective.  
 
2.2. Migration and income convergence   
 
A  number  of  empirical  contributions  have  also  focused  on  the  relationship  between 
income  convergence  and  migration.  Etzo  (2008)  provides  a  recent  survey  of  this 
literature.  Starting  from  the  postulate  of  neoclassical  growth  theory  of  income 
convergence across economies and its empirical implementation by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991) with the benchmark speed of convergence of 2 per cent, Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) suggest that migration is an important source of convergence.  
 
The typical regression design in these studies is given by the following equation 
 
         (1) 
 
Thus these studies estimate regressions in which the (logarithm of the) growth rate of 
GDP per capita in region i over a certain time period (from t-T to t) which is denoted by 
ln(yi,t/yi.t-T) is regressed on the initial (log of) GDP per capita ln(yi.t-T) and the average 
annual net migration rate
5 (mi,t) to this region in the period t-T to t as well as a number of 
further control variables (subsumed in a vector Xi,t), with  i,t being the error term.  
 
If in equation (1)    is statistically significantly smaller  than zero, the sample exhibits 
convergence. Regional disparities have decreased over the time period analysed. This 




Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (2004)  argue  that  the  inclusion  of  migration  (mi,t)  has  two 
potential impacts on the results of convergence estimates. First, if migration is important 
but left aside, estimations will be biased. Including the “missing variable” migration, the 
bias in the convergence coefficient should disappear. This will lead to a decrease in 
                                                 
5 Note that the net migration rate in a region is entered in levels and not in logarithmic form, since 
it can be negative and that as a rule this literature uses total net migration both (i.e. the sum of 
migration from other regions of the same country and from abroad). 8 
 
beta. Second, the parameter   measuring the impact of the net migration rate on regional 
growth  is  predicted  to  be  negative  since  according  to  neoclassical  growth  theory 
migration increases the population and thus reduces the capital – labour ratio which will 
result in lower growth in terms of GDP per capita.  
 
In a recent meta-study of the literature following this approach Ozgen et al (2010) survey 
12  contributions  yielding  67  coefficient  estimates  for    and    with  and  without  the 
inclusion of migration for a wide array of countries. They find that, despite substantial 
variation across studies, the evidence collected on this issue so far seems to weakly 
contradict  the  predictions  of  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (2004).  According  to  them  “the 
overall effect of net migration on growth in real income per capita is positive, but small” 
(Ozgen  et  al,  2010,  p.25)  with  a  one  percentage  point  increase  of  migration  rates 
increasing the per capita GDP growth rate by about 0.1 percentage points. Similarly, the 
estimated rate of beta convergence is slightly increased rather than decreased when the 
migration  rate  is  excluded  from  equation  (1)  although  here  the  change  is  only  0.03 
percentage points.  
 
A  number  of  contributions  extended  on  the  traditional  convergence  regressions 
summarized  by  Ozgen  et  al  (2010)  by  including  additional  controls  for  potential 
differences  in  the  structure  of  migration.  Their  results  are  ambiguous  as  well.  For 
instance Shioji (2001) finds similar results as the meta-study by Ozgen et al (2010). He, 
however, argues that this may be due to the net migration rate measuring two opposite 
effects on convergence. On the one hand the so called quantity effect, which refers to 
the increase in population size, works to reduce growth and foster convergence, on the 
other  hand  the  so  called  composition  effect,  which  refers  to  the  human  capital 
composition  of  migrants,  can  affect  the  growth  rate  positively  and  could  lead  to 
divergence  if  high  skilled  migrants  move  to  well  to  do  regions.  However,  when 
simultaneously  controlling  for  both  the  composition  and  the  quantity  effect  in 
convergence equations he finds that the quantity effect does not attain the correct sign 
either, which leads the author to conclude that the human capital composition of net 
migration cannot explain the positive coefficient of the migration variable on regional 
growth. By contrast Toya et al (2004) following a similar route as Shioji (2001) for the 
Philippines concludes that the composition effect of migration is of some relevance. 
 
In a similar vein Ostbye and Westerlund (2007) argue that due to the heterogeneity of 
migrants  moving  in  and  out  of  a  region  the  focus  of  the  traditional  convergence 
regressions on the net migration rate may be erroneous, since if in-migrants have a 
different  skill  structure than  out-migrants, migration  could  have  a  sizeable  impact  on 
regional growth even if net migration is zero. They therefore estimate alternative models 
including not only net migration rates but also gross-migration (i.e. both in- and outflows 
of migrants). According to their results the sign of the impact of net migration rates on 
GDP growth depends on the specification chosen in both Sweden and Norway but also 
reduces the size of the convergence parameter in most specifications. When, however, 
extending the specification to include gross migration rates their results become much 
less robust and depend heavily on both the specification and country considered. 
 
Aside from these standard convergence studies a number of authors have also followed 
alternative approaches to explore the relationship between migration and convergence 
by using altogether different methods. Borjas (2001) points out that immigration may 
improve regional labour allocation within an economy and thus improve its efficiency. 
Migration would “grease the wheels of labour markets”. He argues that regional wage 
differences – we could also say unemployment differences – persist in a country due to 9 
 
limited internal labour mobility. Immigrants, however, settle in regions which offer higher 
wages (have a higher marginal product of labour due to labour scarcity; we could also 
say  low  unemployment).  Consequently,  migration  would  increase  the  speed  of 
convergence of labour markets. He finds that periods with high immigration to the US 
and labour market segments with high immigration were also periods and labour market 
segments  in  which    convergence  was  rapid,  which  suggests  that  immigrants  from 
abroad may be more important for convergence of GDP levels than internal migration. 
 
By contrast, aside from focusing on standard beta convergence regressions, Pekkala 
and Kangasharju (1998) consider also the impact of migration on sigma convergence by 
running regressions in which a region’s gap (in terms of GDP per capita) to the country’s 
leading region (which in their case is Helsinki) is used as a dependent variable. They find 
that this shift in measuring regional convergence does not change results much. As in 
the standard beta-convergence regression the impact of including the net migration rate 
is  only  minor  and  suggests  that  migration  was  not  an  important  driver  of  income 
convergence in Finland. 
 
Faini (2003) follows a somewhat more heuristic approach by dividing European regions 
into a set of regions in which initial GDP per capita was below the average EU level and 
grew by more than average in the observation period and into a further set in which initial 
GDP per capita was above the EU average but grew by less than average. He refers to 
the two sets of regions as convergent regions and all other regions as divergent. The set 
of divergent regions is further divided into those with initial GDP above average and 
above average growth and those that had below average GDP as well as below average 
growth. He shows that migration moved from convergent poor regions to convergent rich 
regions only in the 1980s but not in the 1990s. In addition he also shows that a logit 
analysis to predict whether a region was convergent or divergent shows a significant 
impact  of  net  migration  only  in  the  1980s,  which  may  point  to  a  changing  role  of 
migration as a driver of convergence over time. 
 
Finally, DiCecio and Gascon (2010) use non-parametric techniques developed by Quah 
(2007) to analyse the effects of migration on income convergence in the US for the 
period  1969-2005.  They  find  that  the  clear  tendencies  of  polarisation  found  when 
analysing  per  capita  personal  income  disappear  once  this  indicator  is  weighted  by 
population growth, which  they interpret as evidence that migration is an important factor 
in driving convergence at least in the US. 
 
In summary, there is by now a relatively large literature on the effects of migration on 
convergence, which despite substantial variations in individual findings, suggests that 
migration  –  at  least  in  European  countries  -  is  only  a  minor  factor  contributing  to 
convergence in GDP per capita. Interestingly, however, virtually all of this literature – 
when  focusing  on  EU  countries  -  has  analyzed  only  convergence  within  individual 
countries and on GDP per capita, although in a European context it could be argued that 
freedom  of  movement  of  labour  between  countries  could  also  have  impacts  on 
convergence  across  countries  and  that  in  the  context  of  the  objectives  of  European 
cohesion  policy,  focusing  on  the  contribution  of  migration  to  convergence  of  other 
indicators, such as unemployment,- could be an important and policy relevant extension 
of the literature.  
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The only study we are aware of that analyses the link between migration and GDP per 
capita  convergence  from  an  EU  wide  perspective  is  Wolszczak-Derlaz  (2009).
6  This 
study – in accordance with much of the results on a national level - finds that migration 
has a significant negative impact on regional GDP per capita growth and a very small 
negative effect on the convergence parameter. 
 
2.2. Migration and productivity and GDP growth 
 
A  number  of  recent  studies  (Mas  et  al  2008,  Paserman  2008,  Huber  et  al  2010, 
Robinson et al  2010) also focus on the impact of migration on productivity and growth. 
In this literature it is often argued that a larger pool of labour is likely to have a positive 
effect on productivity if the quality of migrant labour improves the quality of the workforce 
and that the different skills that migrant labour may have, has the potential to enhance 
technology adoption and adaptation, either by directly contributing to innovation (Mattoo 
et al, 2005), or by facilitating knowledge spillovers (Moen, 2005).
7   
 
Lewis (2005) looking at the US manufacturing sector uses firm level data to explore the 
relationship between the skills mix of migrant labour. He argues that the low skill labour 
supply from foreign sources may potentially have an additionally negative effect, over 
and above the skills mix of  the indigenous workforce because of the degree of path 
dependence in immigration waves that firms will take into account in their choice of 
technology use.   
 
Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002) consider the role of immigrant labour on capital 
investment and labour productivity in the US manufacturing sector.  They find that labour 
productivity is lower in both high and low skilled industries as a result of immigration.  
They attribute this slowdown to problems of assimilation and argue that this may in fact 
be a short run effect, that could disappear as migrants acquire the necessary language 
and social skills. 
 
In a comparison of Spain and the UK Mas et al (2008) use both growth accounting and 
econometric  estimation  techniques  to  explore  the  impact  of  migrant s  on  domestic 
performance. Their industry level analysis distinguishes between the two countries, 
where the experience with migration is extremely different.  The UK has historically been 
the recipient of migrant labour, whereas until the mid 1990s, Spain had experienced very 
little.  They find that the Spanish workforce demography has been significantly affected 
by the influx of migrants, whereas the UK has seen little change, and little effect. Taking 
account of the quality of labour, Mas et al (2008) fin d there to be a small but barely 
significant positive impact to immigrants in the UK, but a significantly negative impact in 
Spain. In addition, it is clear from the industry analysis undertaken in this paper that 
migrant labour is significantly industrially concentrated.  Thus, skills and industry seem to 
be specific factors that need to be taken into consideration in any future analyses.   
 
                                                 
6 In addition, Bems and Schelkens (2008) look at the effects of emigration from poor countries 
such as the EU12 on wage rates by simulation experiments with a CGE-model. While their results 
show  that  emigration  fosters  wage  growth  and  thus  convergence,  they,  however,  make  no 
reference to the size of this effect on any individual EU country. 
7 In addition to this there is also a substantial literature devoted t o the potential positive impact of 
migration on entrepreneurship (e.g.  Wadhwa, Saxenian, Rissing and Gereffi,  2007), innovation 
(e.g.  Hunt  and  Gauthier -Loiselle,  2008),  foreign  trade  and  foreign  direct  investments  (e.g. 
Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer, 2005 and Kugler and Rapoport, 2005,) 11 
 
Paserman (2008) takes a firm perspective to consider the impact of an unprecedented 
increase in the labour force in Israel on firm performance in manufacturing. She employs 
a growth accounting generated TFP estimate and regresses migration terms on this and 
finds that migrant share of the workforce is negatively associated with productivity in low 
tech sectors, but some indication of a positive effect in high tech manufacturing sectors.  
In addition, her analysis indicates that there was a negative relationship between migrant 
scientists and productivity in low tech sectors.  Ultimately, the conclusion to be drawn 
from this analysis is that it is not just a question of getting high skilled migrants into the 
workforce, but they have to be used effectively.  
 
Finally  in  a  recent  study  Huber  et  al  (2010)  focus  on  the  effects  of  migration  on 
productivity growth on an industry level and on GDP per capita growth on a regional 
level. This contribution finds that migration leads to an increase of productivity growth in 
the European Industries which is, however, strongly contingent on the skill structure of 
migrants. Furthermore using regional data this study also shows that an increase in the 
share of high skilled migrants leads to an increase in GDP per capita growth. 
 
3.  Data set issues and available indicators  
 
3.1 The European Labour Force Suvey 
 
Our  aim  in  this  study  is  to  analyze  the  contribution  of  migration  to  convergence  or 
divergence between the EU NUTS2 regions in unemployment rates, per capita income 
and productivity. To this end we use data from two different sources. The first of these is 
a special extract from the European  Labour Force Survey  (ELFS)  provided to us by 
EUROSTAT. This provides information on the regional stock of active aged (15 to 64 
year old) native and foreign born population residing in NUTS2 regions differentiated by 
region of birth (natives, foreign born from other EU15 countries, from EU12 and from 
third countries), by educational attainment levels (tertiary educated with ISCED level 5 or 
more education, intermediary education level – ISCED 3 or 4, and low educated with 
ISCED level 2 or less) and (ILO) employment status (unemployed, employed and out of 
the labour force).  
 
These data cover the period from 1995 to 2008 and allow us to calculate employment 
and unemployment rates as well as population shares of foreign born and natives by 
educational attainment, region of birth and NUTS2 region of residence in the EU. In 
principle this data would allow us to focus in some detail on the impact of net immigration 
from abroad on labour markets. Unfortunately, however, they do not provide a possibility 
to derive information on the emigration of natives as well as the mobility of the foreign 
born  or  natives  within  a  country.  This  means  that  for  our  purposes  this  data  omits 
important aspects of migration (such as internal migration and net migration of natives). 
 
Furthermore, although we took great care to recode changing NUTS2 codes wherever 
possible, repeated changes in the definition of NUTS2 regions, changes in the system of 
encoding foreigners and labour market status as well as of the education variables in this 
time period lead to substantial missing data problems. In particular: 
 
  The German Labour Force Survey does not include the question concerning country 
of birth, so that for this country we have no information of the foreign born. 12 
 
  Data  for  many  of  the  countries  starts  reporting  a  breakdown  of  the  working  age 
population by region of birth only in later years than 1995. This applies to Bulgaria 
(which reports these figures from 2006 onwards), the Czech Republic (from 2002 
onwards),  Estonia  (1998),  Hungary  (2001),  Ireland  (2006),  Italy  (2005),  Latvia 
(2004), Malta (2005), Netherlands (1999), Poland (2004), Portugal (1999),  Romania 
(2002), Slovenia (2002) and Slovakia (2003). Thus for these countries only data from 
the year given in brackets could be used in our analysis. 
  In addition for Cyprus the labour market status is missing before 2000, so that here 
we can use only observations for the time period from 2000 onwards. 
 
In addition to these limitations, there are also a number of caveats that have to be taken 
into  consideration  when  interpreting this  data. The first  of this  is that the  ELFS  is  a 
household  based  survey  which  focuses  on  permanent  residence.  This  implies  that 
temporary and irregular migration is severely underestimated. This in turn implies that 
the  recent  moves  of  EU12  residents  to  certain  EU  countries  that  were  often  of  a 
temporary nature or even encompassed elements of long distance commuting may be 
underrepresented.  
 
The second caveat is that as with all survey based data, the ELFS also suffers from an 
element  of  non-response.  In  the  context  of  our  application  this  is  most  severe  with 
respect to the information concerning the region of birth and the educational attainment 
of the respondents. With respect  to the education structure of the foreign born non-
response  rates  exceed  or  approach  the  20  percent  mark  in  several  EU12  countries 
(Estonia, Hungary, and Latvia) as well as Ireland and the UK, and is somewhat lower but 
still at around 5 per cent in Sweden. Furthermore non-response rates are below the 10 
per cent mark in Denmark only in the period from 2003 to 2006, around 3 per cent in the 
Netherlands from 2004 to 2006 and in Luxemburg they attain a very high value in 1998. 
Similar observations apply to region of birth. Here in the UK Labour Force Survey over 
10 per cent of the active aged do not respond to the question on region of birth. In 
Estonia, Latvia and Hungary this non-response rate is between 5 and 10 per cent and in 
Sweden this rate approaches the 5 per cent mark. In addition once more for Denmark 
only  the  years  2003  to  2006  seem  to  have  low  non-response  rates  and  for  other 
countries non-response rates are high for certain subperiods. This applies in particular to 
Finland in the years 1999/2000, France (1995 to 1997) and Luxemburg in 1998 (and to a 
lesser degree from 1999 to 2002). 
 
Finally, ELFS data also represents only a sample of the population and has been subject 
to  repeated  methodological  change  in  the  period  observed  here.  This  implies  that 
individual aggregates may be too small to allow a reliable estimate of the population size 
of  a  particular  group.  In  this  respect  EUROSTAT  (see 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/employment/info/data/eu_lfs/index.htm)  provides  country 
specific  upper  and  lower  confidence  bounds  under  which  estimated  numbers  should 
either be highlighted to signify low reliability (upper  bound)  or suppressed altogether 
when they fall below the lower bound. Second, however, the ELFS is subject to sampling 
error and thus there may be large fluctuations in the estimates of the size in particular 
small estimation groups, which are likely to be aggravated by changes in definitions.  
 
3.2 EUROSTAT – Regional data 
 
The second data set we use is the EUROSTAT Regio Database as provided on the 
EUROSTAT  homepage.  We  use  this  to  construct  our  dependent  and  most  of  our 
independent variables for analysis. In particular as dependent variables we use the 13 
 
 
  Unemployment  rate  –  which  is  calculated  from  data  on  the  economically  active 
(employed and unemployed) and unemployed as the unemployment rate of the 15-
64 year olds (ur_tot) and is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 
  Youth  unemployment  rate  -  which  is  calculated  from  data  on  the  economically 
active and unemployed (in levels) as the unemployment rate of the 15-24 year olds 
(ur_y) and is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 
  Long-term unemployment rate – which is calculated as the number of long-term 
unemployed in total economically active and is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 
  GDP per inhabitant at PPS  calculated from the indicator on GDP at purchasing 
power standards in million € and the total average annual population and measured 
in 1000 Euros per inhabitant and year (gdp_inh_pps) 
  Labour productivity - which we proxy by real GDP per employed (which is taken 
from the Cambridge Econometrics database) measured in million Euros (prod).  
 
These  data  are  also  characterized  by  some  missing  data  problems  in  particular  in 
Denmark,  Germany  and  the  UK.  We  miss  data  on  the  unemployment,  youth 
unemployment  and  long-term  unemployment  rate for  individual  years  in  7  regions  in 
Germany and 2 regions in the UK, and for Denmark we miss all regional information 
before 2007. We deal with these problems in different ways. For those regions where 
only a few years are missing (i.e. Germany and the UK) we extra- (or intra-) polate the 
relevant information based either on the information available from higher tier (NUTS1) 
regions and/or a time trend.
8 For the Danish data we take national data. This gives us a 
complete panel of observation s on unemployment for the years 2000   to 2009 which 
includes all countries but Bulgaria (where the beginning date is 2003). With respect to 
GDP per capita we miss observations only for 2 regions in Germany and the 2 regions in 
the UK for 1999 to 2000 and intra- and extrapolate this data in the same way as above. 
Hence we have a complete series of GDP per capita indicators for the time period from 
1998  to  2007.   For  productivity,  after  extrapolating  data  for  employment  for  5 
observations in Germany, we have a full data set. 
 
Aside from these dependent variables EUROSTAT data also provides information about 
a number of migration indicators. These are the 
 
  Migration  rate  –  Since  data  on  migration  rates  provided  by  Eurostat  in  many 
countries starts rather late (i.e. after the year 2003) or is missing altogether (Belgium, 
Greece and Italy) we compute the migration rate from as the difference between total 
population growth minus the natural population growth (i.e. live births minus deaths).
9 
This is a similar indicator as the crude migration rate by Eurostat (with the correlation 
coefficient between the two indicators amounting to 0.99 for those cases where data 
is available for both indicators) but provides information for a larger number of years 
on a much larger number of countries. The only countri es where we have missing 
observations are Germany and the UK. These missing data problems are due to 
missing information on the same regions in the same years in Germany as for 
unemployment data. These data are thus imputed as above. For the UK data are 
                                                 
8 See the background data description in Annex I for details 
9  Note that in doing this we correct for erroneous population data and major breaks in the 
population series by using national data. We thank Grzegorz Gorzelak, Kar ol Frank and Petr 
Rozmahel for making us aware of a number of caveats with respect to population data from 
Eurostat. 14 
 
missing from 2005 onwards as well as for the years 2001 and 2002. We therefore 
omit the UK from the analysis. 
 
  Arrivals, Departures and net population moves due to internal migration – In 
addition to account for potential differences of the effects of internal and international 
migration  we  also  use  the  indicator  of  arrivals  and  departures
10  due to internal 
migration (i.e. migration within country borders) as a percentage of the population at 
the beginning of the year. These indicators can also be used to calc ulate the net 
immigration rate from internal migration by taking the differences between arrivals 
and departures in percent of the population. This is available for many countries for 
the  time  period  2000 -2007  but  despite  our  efforts  to  increase  sample  size  by 
incorporating other information we were unable to obtain any data for Germany, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and the UK. Thus we have to omit these countries 
from our analysis of the potential differential impact of internal and international 
migration. 
  Net  emigration  rate  from  abroad  –  Finally,  by  taking  differences  between  the 
imputed net migration rate and the net immigration rate due to internal migration we 
can also calculate the net emigration rate from abroad to a particular region. Since 
these net migration rates from abroad are imputed from data on total net migration 
and internal migration, we miss data on the same countries as for internal migration 
rates. 
 
Finally EUROSTAT data is also used as information source for other factors that are 
likely to influence the development of regional unemployment rates and GDP growth. 
Indeed the literature of regional unemployment disparities has suggested a large number 
of different factors that may have an impact on regional unemployment. Synthesizing this 
literature  Elhorst  (2003)  suggests  a  variety  of  variables,  which  in  general  have  a 
significant  impact  on  regional  unemployment.  Furthermore,  the  literature  on  growth 
econometrics  has  identified  a  large  set  of  potential  growth  regressors  (Durlauf  et  al 
2004). Of these variables we are able to construct the following from our data sources:  
 
  The share of young population – which is operationalised by the share of those 
aged below 25 in the population (youngsh). For which we have data from 1998 to 
2009 for all EU countries, with missing observations occurring in the same German 
and UK regions (and years) for which we also have no unemployment rates. We thus 
also impute this data by the same method as above. We expect this indicator to have 
a positive impact on the aggregate unemployment rate since young persons are in 
general faced by above average unemployment rates. Furthermore we also include 
this indicator as a proxy for  labour supply developments in a region in GDP per 
capita and productivity regressions. 
  Natural population growth rate – measured as the number of births minus deaths 
per inhabitant at the beginning of the year (natpopgr) and with similar missing data 
problems as unemployment rates, which are also solved in the same way. This is 
used in GDP per capita regressions since (ceteris paribus) as a further proxy for 
                                                 
10  Note  that  in  the  Regio  database  this  indicator  is  provided  excluding  data  for  Belgium  and 
excluding the Netherlands for the years 2000 to 2002. To complete our data, we thus augment 
this data with data on place to place migration available from these two countries also provided 
on the Regio website. 15 
 
labour supply growth.
11 We expect GDP per capita to grow less rapidly in regions 
with more rapid natural population growth. 
  region dummies which we use to control for time invariant amenities (such as for 
instance natural beauty, weather) 
  Growth of compensation per employee – (comp_emp). We expect regions with 
higher compensation growth all else equal to have higher unemployment growth.  
  Share of high educated and Share of low educated –- measured as the share of 
employed with a tertiary (ISCED 5 or more) education (highedsh) and the share with 
a low (ISCED 2 or lower) education (lowedsh), respectively and where missing data 
problems  for  Germany  are  once  more  solved  in  the  same  way  as  for  data  on 
employment  and  unemployment  for  the  same  regions  and  years  as  employment 
data. We expect that a higher share of highly skilled (or a lower share of less skilled) 
increases GDP growth  (on account of a higher productivity of highly skilled) and 
reduces unemployment rate growth (due lower unemployment rates among the high 
skilled). 
  Sectoral shifts in employment – which are measured by the turbulence index (i.e. 
the sum of absolute changes in shares over sectors of employment as compared to 
the  previous  year)  (turb)  calculated  from  employment  data  on  a  crude  sectoral 
breakdown which differentiates between employment in agriculture, manufacturing, 
construction, trade and restaurants and transport (as one group), financial services 
and real estate, and non-market services. Here again missing data for Germany are 
imputed as above. We expect regions with larger sectoral shifts to have more rapid 
unemployment  rate  growth,  while  the  impact  of  this  variable  on  GDP  per  capita 
growth cannot be determined and depends on the relative productivity of growing 
and declining sectors. 
  Diversity  –  which  is  measured  by  the  inverse  herfindahl  index  over  the  sectoral 
share (herf_inv) based on the same sectoral breakdown as the turbulence index and 
where missing data problems are dealt with in the same way. Here regions with 
higher diversity may experience lower steady state unemployment rates. 
  National unemployment rate – which is measured in the same way as the regional 
unemployment rate (see above) (nat_ur). This is used to proxy for potentially time 
varying national factors (such as asymmetric business cycles or institutional change 
at the national level) influences on regional unemployment rates. It should have a 
positive impact on the regional unemployment rate. 
  Long-term unemployment – measured by the share of unemployed with a duration 
in excess of 12 months in  per cent of the labour force. This suffers from the same 
missing data problems as the total unemployment rate which are solved in the same 
way  as  for  total  unemployment  data  (see  description  above).  Again  this  variable 
should impact positively on aggregate unemployment. 
  The investment rate – which we measure as gross fixed capital formation (invest) 
as a share of GDP and for which we do not have any data on Cyprus and Latvia. 
This variable is used to proxy for changes in the capital stock and should have a 
positive impact on GDP growth. 
  Sectoral employment shares – of agriculture (agsh), industry (indsh), construction 
(consh), tansport and trade (tradsh), financial services (finsh), non-market services 
(nmssh). We have no hypothesis on the sign of these variables, but use them as 
controls for potentially different sectoral employment and GDP developments in our 
regression by including at most one of these variables to avoid co-linearity. 
 
                                                 
11 Note that this is, however, a rather imperfect measure since demographic changes in labour 
supply are driven by changes in the active aged population. 16 
 
Given the data situation we can therefore derive a consistent data set of our dependent 
as well as independent variables which allows us to analyze the impact of migration on 
regional  convergence  of  unemployment  rates  (as  well  as  youth,  and  long-term 
unemployment rates) 2000 to 2007 for all EU27 countries with the exception of Bulgaria 
and the UK and of GDP per capita and productivity for the time period with the exception 
of  Bulgaria,  Latvia,  Cyprus  and  the  UK.  When,  however,  extending  this  analysis  to 
account for potential differences in the effects of internal or external migration our data 
becomes more restricted since we have to exclude Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and the UK. These restrictions become even more severe once we match this 
data with indicators on the structure of migration from abroad taken from the ELFS, since 
here in addition we also induce missing data problems for the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia so that here we miss data 
on 16 out of 27 EU countries. 
 
4.  Some Empirical Facts 
 
Our regarded indicators reveal a number of interesting developments which complement 
our econometric analyses.  
 
Figure 1: Development of Regional Disparities in EU27: Coefficient of Variation of Unemployment 
and GDP Per Capita and Productivity  
 
Source: EUROSTAT, own calculations. 
 
For  instance  figure  1  shows  the  development  of  regional  disparities  in  the  EU27  by 
displaying the coefficient of variation for regional per capita income, productivity, the total 
unemployment  rate  as  well  as  youth  and  long-term  unemployment  rates.  Evidently, 
unemployment disparities among regions are much larger than income and productivity 
disparities. Youth and long-term unemployment disparities are largest, while productivity 
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productivity disparities are diminishing over the whole period considered, although to a 
modest extent. Thus there is a steady process of income and productivity convergence 
taking place in EU27 since 2000. Unemployment rates have converged over the whole 
period to a major extent, despite an apparent cyclical pattern which reveals a peak in 
2002 and a new increase in 2007. Unemployment disparities are larger than income 
disparities in the EU one for this may be labour rigidities. The dramatic disparities in 
unemployment in the pre-2004 period can be attributed to the substantial unemployment 
in the EU12 which has piled up as a consequence of economic restructuring.   
 











Source: EUROSTAT, own calculations Note: figure is based on average annual growth rates of GDP per capita 
at purchasing power parities in the time period 2000-2007 and GDP per capita level (at purchasing power 
standards in 2007) , Convergence from above = region has above average GDP per capita level in 2000, but 
below average growth rates, Convergence from below  = region has below average GDP per capita level in 
2000, but above average growth rates, Divergence from above = region has above average GDP per capita 
level in 2000 and above average growth rates,  Divergence from below = region has below average GDP per 
capita level in 2000 and below average growth rates. 
 
The steady income convergence process observable between EU27 regions is the result 
of catching up and falling behind regions. In Figure 2 we indicate the adherence of EU 
regions to the region types of converging and diverging regions. Converging regions are 
either those with a per capita income below EU average in 2000 and an above average 
growth rate in 2000-2007 (converging from below) or regions with an above average 
initial income and below average growth (converging from above). Similarly, diverging 
regions are either regions with a below average initial income and below average growth 18 
 
(diverging from below) or regions with above average initial income and above average 
growth (diverging from above). We notice that the major share of Eastern European 
regions and the Iberian Peninsula are converging from below. In contrast, Southern Italy, 
the major part of Greece, several East German regions, the North of the Czech Republic 
and  the  South  of  Hungary  are  diverging  from  below.  The  main  share  of  EU15  is 
converging from above. In addition a part of the EU15, (Ireland, the North-East of Spain, 
Cyprus, some regions of Belgium and the Netherlands as well as the majority of Finnish 
regions) is diverging from above.  
 
Figure  3:  Total  Net  Migration  in  Per  Cent  of  Total  Population  by  Country  and  Selected  time 
periods  
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Source:    EUROSTAT,  own  calculations,  Figure  reports  sum  of  absolute  net  migration  across 
regions by year in per cent of total population. 
 
Furthermore, figure 3 provides evidence on the extent of international migration in the 
EU by looking at the total net migration rate by country
12. We see a significant variation 
in net migration. Leaving aside the extreme cases of Malta and Cyprus that received 
exceptionally high immigration – they are small islands and may have attracted residents 
due to their attractiveness as a second domicile and as a location for headquarters - we 
observe  that  Spain,  Luxemburg,  Ireland,  Italy  and  Portugal  show  the  highest  net 
migration  rates.  In  the  time  period  2004  to  2007  between  1.9-5.3  per  cent  of  the 
population  immigrated  to  these  countries.
13  Immigration rates have  also been rather 
persistent. All immigration countries (with the exception of the Netherlands) in the period 
                                                 
12  Since  population  data  from  EUROSTAT  disaccords  with  national  sources  in  a  number  of 
instances we checked for consistency of our migration data and corrected for discrepancies using 
national sources in the critical cases of Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. For the other 
countries (in particular the EU10, the Netherlands and Cyprus) national sources are consistent 
with national sources and results in the literature (see e.g. Facchini, Mayda 2008),. 
13 Note that the UK which is also a candidate for high migration is not included in our sample.   19 
 
2000 to 2003 were also immigration countries in the period 2004 to 2007 and also all 
emigration  countries  in  the  earlier  period  remained  so  later.  Only  the  Netherlands 
changed  from  an  immigration  to  an  emigration  country  between  the  pre-  and  post-
enlargement periods considered here. Finally, figure 3 also shows, that in contrast to the 
perception in the public debate also the majority of the EU12 countries (Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia) are (and have been for the majority 
of the 2000’s) net immigration countries. The only EU27 countries that are net emigration 
countries are Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Romania and (since 2004) the Netherlands). 






Source:  EUROSTAT,  own  calculations.  Note  Figure  displays  total  immigration  or 
emigration in the period 2000 to 2007 
 
Looking at total net migration not at the country but at the regional level we see that 
within  our  countries  a  number  of regions  are  net  emigration regions. They  comprise 
practically entire Romania, the major part of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, the peripheral 
regions  of  Sweden  and  Finland,  Southern  Italy  and  Northern  France (see  Figure  4). 
Ireland, the South and North-Eastern part of Spain, the South-West and South of France 
as well as North and Central Italy, and Cyprus are heavy net-immigration areas.   
 
Table 1 shows the skill composition of international migration according to the ELFS for 
the years 2000 and 2008. Although we are missing quite a few observations in 2000 we 
see  that  in  most  countries  the  share  of  high-skilled  immigrants  has  increased.  Most 
notable exceptions are Spain and Lithuania. Most countries receive the largest share of 
immigrants  in  the  segment  of  medium-skilled  labour.  Exceptions  are  Belgium,  the 
Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece in EU15 and Malta and Poland 
which  received  mainly  low-skilled  immigrants.  Aside  from  these  cases  low  skilled 
immigration has generally decreased.  20 
 
 
Looking  at  the  share  of  highly  and  lowly  skilled  foreign  born  residing  in  the  NUTS2 
regions of these countries reveals some further stylized facts: In particular a high share 
of highly skilled foreign born is found in most of the UK regions and Sweden as well as in 
a number of countries with a rather low share of foreign born in total population (e.g. 
Romania) but also in the Baltic countries. In these latter countries high skilled migration 
can be associated with significant inward FDI. A high share of low skilled migrants by 
contrast is found in Spain, Italy and France, while the regions in the Central European 
Countries  (Austria  and  the  Czech  Republic  but  also  most  of  Hungary  and  Slovakia) 
primarily host medium skilled foreign borns. In total there thus is a clear North-South 
differential in the skill content of migration in the EU 27 (Figure 5). We have to note that 
the skill patterns for the Spanish regions are bizarre and do not correspond to the fact  
 
Table 1: Skill Structure of Foreign Born Population by Country and Selected Years (in per cent) 
 
  low  Medium  high 
  2000  2008  2000  2008  2000  2008 
AT  42.0  35.6  44.8  48.2  13.1  16.2 
BE  55.8  48.2  24.3  27.6  19.9  24.3 
BG    19.9    47.3    32.8 
CY  29.5  28.7  36.5  39.7  34.0  31.6 
CZ    22.5    56.3    21.2 
DK  20.9  26.8  33.4  31.5  17.2  22.8 
EE  22.7  12.1  40.3  42.3  26.7  28.3 
ES  49.5  45.9  23.7  32.4  26.4  20.8 
FI  37.6  33.4  34.1  40.3  24.6  26.3 
FR  58.9  51.8  24.2  27.5  16.9  20.7 
GR  44.2  49.9  38.2  36.8  17.7  13.3 
HU    20.5    46.2    24.2 
IE    18.5    33.0    35.6 
IT    49.0    39.2    11.8 
LT  26.3  21.3  33.1  54.0  40.6  24.6 
LU  50.5  36.5  28.6  32.2  18.8  31.3 
LV    14.7    49.4    20.2 
MT    53.3    26.8    19.8 
NL  49.7  38.3  31.2  36.3  18.4  24.2 
PL    41.4    42.9    15.7 
PT  63.0  54.2  23.8  26.0  13.2  19.8 
RO    19.0    46.3    34.7 
SE  33.3  31.3  39.5  35.0  23.3  28.7 
SI    33.1    55.7    11.2 
SK    14.5    64.0    21.5 


















Source: ELFS, Note data reports average shares for the time period 2004-2007 22 
 
 
reported  elsewhere  in  the  literature. While  the ELFS  would  suggest that  high  skilled 
immigration is highest in Galicia, Martin-Montaner et al (2009) for example report that 
high skilled immigrants are particularly found on the Baleares, Canaries, Valencia, Rioja, 
Madrid  but  not  Galicia.  With  respect  to  low  skilled  immigrants  those  are  located 
according to Martin-Montaner (2009)  on the Mediterranean side but not in Castilla La 
Mancha and Extremadura as proposed by ELFS data.  
 
Finally, table 2 shows the change in international migration by region of birth: EU 15, 
EU12 and rest of the world. The figures relate to total net migration in the segment of 
origin observed over the period 2000-2007 as a share of population in 2000. Clearly, 
migration flows with third countries are most important for EU countries. Cyprus, Spain, 
Austria, Sweden, the UK and Portugal have received important immigrations ranging 
from 2 per cent of the population in 2000 in the UK to 8 per cent in Spain. Unfortunately, 
other potential high immigrant countries from third countries, like Germany, cannot be 
included  for  this  indicator.  In  Spain,  the  UK,  Sweden,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands 
immigration from EU12 follows in the second place in importance. Again, we miss the 
data for Ireland and Italy which should also have a noticeable share of immigrants from 
EU12. Luxemburg and Cyprus show important immigration from EU15.       
 
 
Table 2:  Change in Stock of Foreign Born Population 2000-2007  
(in  per cent of Total Resident Population 2000) 
 
  pop_nms  pop_old  pop_oth 
Austria  0.7  0.6  3.8 
Belgium  0.3  -1.1  1.2 
Cyprus  1.4  2.4  6.3 
Denmark  0.1  0.1  2.8 
Estonia  0.1  0.0  -3.8 
Spain  2.1  0.8  8.0 
Finland  0.2  0.7  1.4 
France  0.1  -0.1  0.6 
Greece  0.4  -0.1  1.9 
Lithuania  -0.2  0.0  -1.3 
Luxemburg  0.8  5.1  0.5 
Netherlands  0.2  -0.1  -0.1 
Portugal  0.2  0.2  2.0 
Sweden  0.4  -0.1  3.7 
UK  0.7       0.1       2.1 
       
Total  0.7  0.1  2.6 
Source: ELFS  
 
5.  Specification  
 
In  our  empirical  analysis  we  follow  the  literature  on  the  impact  of  migration  on 
convergence  and  estimate  three  central  equations.  The  first  one  relates  regional 23 
 
unemployment rates to the lagged unemployment rate and indicators on net migration 
(e.g. the net migration rate or its subcategories international and internal migration) as 
well as a number of control variables. The second one relates GDP per capita (at PPS) 
to lagged GDP per capita levels as well as our measures of migration and a set of 
control variables, while the third one relates productivity in a region (measured as real 
GDP  per  capita)  to  lagged  productivity,  migration  indicators  and  a  set  of  control 
variables. 
 
More specifically for each of the dependent variables (log unemployment rate, log GDP 
per  capita  and  log  productivity)  we  follow  recent  contributions  to  the  convergence 




     (3) 
 
Where   is the respective dependent variable in region i and period t,   is 
the lagged dependent variable in the same region,   is the net migration rate of 
region i in period t and   is a vector of control variables which may differ for different 
dependent variables. The   are a family of region specific intercept terms which are 
used to control for any unobserved time invariant regional characteristics (such as for 
instance amenities) that may impact on the rate of growth,   is a set of time specific 
intercepts  that  control  common  time  specific  shocks  (such  as  for  instance  common 
business cycle effects) to all regions.  ,  , and   are coefficients to be estimated and   
is a stochastic (i.i.d) error term.  
 
With respect to unemployment as a dependent variable this specification is similar to that 
used  in  the  literature  (e.g.  Lemos  and  Portes  2008,  Borjas  1999,  Card  2001  and 
Dustman et al 2005) where unemployment rates are related to migration and control 
variables. Given the objectives of this study we, however, extend this by including the 
lagged  unemployment  rate.  This  will  allow  us,  first  of  all,  to  draw  also  conclusions 
whether our regions were convergent in unemployment in our observation period and,  
second of all, to test the impact of the inclusion of the migration rate in equation (3) on 
the convergence parameter ( ). 
 
For  the  control  variables   we  use  different  variables  in  each  equation  based  on 
previous literature. In particular, with respect to the unemployment rate – as discussed in 
the data section – our choice of control variables is based on the literature survey by 
Elhorst (2003). With respect to the GDP per capita, by contrast, we follow the literature 
on income convergence and include the population growth rate and investments as well 
as proxies for the education and age structure of the population, sectoral shares and the 
turbulence index. For the productivity equation we use the same variables as in the GDP 
per capita equation, but use the unemployment rate to proxy for labour supply. 
 
As widely discussed in the literature, estimation of equations (3) and (4) is associated 
with  a  number  of  problems.  The  first  one  of  these  is  endogeneity:  Immigrants  from 
abroad select regions of residence where they find the highest return, (i.e. those regions 
with low unemployment and high income - Borjas 2001). This may result in a spurious 
positive  impact  of  migration  on  the  labour  market  due  to  a  reversed  causality.  The 
                                                 
14 Note  that this equation follows directly from noticing in equation (1)  by 
 and rearranging. 24 
 
literature  usually  suggests  solving  this  by  instrumentation.  The  problem  is  to  find 
appropriate instruments, with much of the literature using lagged migration rates or lags 
of population growth (e.g. Dustmann et al 2005, Bonin 2005). In our case since we are 
estimating a dynamic panel data model, we follow the suggestion of Blundell and Bond 
(1998), to use both the lagged levels and differences of all variables as instruments and 
apply  system  GMM  using  a  maximum  of  two  lags  of  all  independent  variables  as 
instruments. This has the advantage that aside from controlling for the endogeneity of 
the migration variable also the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variables as well as 
of other dependent variables can be controlled for.
15 
 
A second problem is that international migration may induce internal migration flows in 
the recipient country. Thus assessing the unemployment  impact over all regions of a 
country may result in a spurious positive impact of immigration on labour markets for this 
reason. This, however, is not relevant in the context of the present study since in all of 
our regressions internal migration of nationals is included in the measures of migration or 
as a separate dependent variable as recommended by Dustmann et al 2005.
16 
 
Finally,  it  is  also  important  to  select  the  right  regional  aggregation  level  to  draw 
conclusions on migration effects.
17 The region should represent a good approximation to 
a closed labour market ,  meaning that labour would only search for work within the 
region. If the aggregation level is too low one will have the situation that workers might 
move to surrounding regions if competing with migrants. With low-skilled work the closed 
labour market is commonly found at a more disaggregate geographical level since low 
paid workers cannot afford distant commuting. We look at the regional level, NUTS2 
level, since we also include all internal mig rants in our regressions, the only form of 
mobility that could cause such bias in our application is commuting. We think, however, 
that given the size of NUTS2 regions this is not a major impediment to our analysis, 
although we cannot preclude that commuti ng flows are of importance in some urban -
suburban contexts also in a NUTS2 specification.  
 
6.  Results 
 
6.1 Results for Convergence in Unemployment  
 
Table  3  presents  the  results  of  our  estimates  for  5  different  specifications  for  the 
unemployment  rate  equation.  In  the  first  of  these  (reported  in  the  first  column)  we 
estimate equation (3) excluding the net migration rate, in column 2 by contrast results 
when including the migration rate are reported. In column three we expand our baseline 
                                                 
15 We also perform a number of tests to determine the validity and exogeneity of our instruments. 
In particular we perform the Sargan test for the exogeneity of the instruments. Here the null is 
exogeneity so that we do not want to reject this null hypothesis. In addition we also test for the 
absence of AR2 residuals. In all specifications reported below, these tests indicate both validity 
and exogeneity of the instruments, although in some cases we could not reject the null of AR2 
residuals. We report p-values of all tests below, but do not comment on them in the text. 
16 An alternative probably superior strategy to identify effects of migration is to use the skill level 
of migrants distinguishing between occupational groups or different education or work experience 
(see: Bonin 2005, Card 2001 and Borjas 2003). We would have liked to follow this approach too, 
but unfortunately due to data constraints described above this avenue is not open to our analysis. 
17 Borjas (2006) recommends to analyse on county and not district level.  25 
 
specification by including measures of net internal and external migration to focus on 
potential differences in effects of internal and external migrants.
18 We do this because 
external migrants moving to a region from abroad may  differ from internal migrants in 
terms of education structure and in addition may often face problems of transferring their 
skills across countries on account of differences in the education system or also simply 
because of language problems. Internal migrants that move place of residence within a 
country only, by contrast, are less likely to suffer from such problems of skill -transfer. 
This implies that immigration from abroad may not lead to the same results as migration 
within a country even when the education structure of both groups of migrants is similar. 
Finally in columns (4) and (5) we  focus on potential asymmetries of the impact among 
net emigration and net immigrations region as defined in figure  5  by restricting our 
sample to either immigration (column 4) or emigration (column 5) regions only.  
 
The results presented in this table provide strong evidence of conditional convergence in 
unemployment rates among the European regions analyzed in this paper in the period 
2000-2007. The coefficient on the lagged unemployment rate in table 3 ranges between 
0.555 and 0.625 depending on the specification used. This implies a convergence (beta) 
coefficient of between  -0.38 and  -0.45.
19  The only results for which the estimated 
coefficients on the lagged unemployment rate are slightly higher (and thus convergence 
parameters somewhat lower) are those where we restrict the sample to either only 
immigration and emigration regions (columns 4 and 5). This is, however, due to the fact 
that in these specifications this parameter measures convergence among emigration and 
immigration regions only 
 
Also the control variables included by and large accord with expectations and previous 
literature (see Elhorst 2003). A large share of young population residing in a region is 
associated with a significantly higher unemployment  rate in all specifications shown in 
table  3. Also a higher share of agricultural employment, a higher compensation per 
employee, and a higher long-term unemployment rate imply higher unemployment rates 
and increased structural change reduces unemployment. The only somewhat surprising 
result  is  that  regions  with  a  more  diverse  industrial  structure  tend  to  have  lower 
unemployment rates in our estimates. This may, however, be due to  the fact that in the 
time period considered in our estimation industrial regions also experienced the fastest 
employment growth. Regions with a high specialisation in industry therefore often have 
lower unemployment rates in our data. 
 
Furthermore the results suggest a rather limited impact of including migration on the 
parameter value of the beta convergence term, which as explained above may be 
considered as an indication of a minor impact of migration on the rate of convergence. 
The convergence parameter of the unemployment rate equation  is slightly lower when 
including the migration rate in the equation, however, the reduction amounts to less than 
one standard error of the original estimate and is thus insignificant at any conventional 
significance  level.  Thus  as  much  of  the  previous  literature  focusing  on  income 
convergence we find hardly any evidence that controlling for migration reduces the size 
of the convergence parameter in unemployment rates. 
 
                                                 
18 As pointed out in the data description, this has the disadvantage that due to data constraints 
we have to exclude Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal as well as Bulgaria and the UK 
from the regression which results in a sharp drop in the number of observations. 













(4) only imigration 
regions 
(5) only emigration 
regions 
   Coefficient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E 
ln(unemployment rate) lagged  0.558  ***  0.090  0.625  **  0.094  0.566  ***  0.087  0.770  ***  0.065  0.676  ***  0.160 
net migration rate          0.175    0.162          0.097    0.136  0.172    0.186 
net internal migration rate                  0.026    0.111               
net migration rate from abroad                  0.166    0.140               
national population growth  -0.491    0.363  -0.460    0315  -0.451    0.309  -0.189    0.295  -0.471    1.126 
share of young population  -0.028    0.026  0.034    0.025  0.051  ***  0.020  0.015    0.329  -0.068    0.081 
shareof low educated  -0.149    0.099  -0.164    0.117  0.006    0.095  -0.204  *  0.112  0.721    0.783 
agriculture share  4.072  ***  1.060  1.933  **  1.006  1.076    1.031  2.122    1.478  2.557    2.367 
Ln(Turbulence index)  -0.045  **  0.018  -0.036  **  0.015  -0.031  ***  0.016  -0.044  **  0.018  -0.051  **  0.020 
ln(compensation per employee)  0.362  ***  0.134  0.191  *  0.103  0.287  **  0.105  0.224  *  0.129  -0.113    0.185 
ln(long-term unemployment rate)  0.239  **  0.099  0.136  *  0.078  0.149  ***  0.070  0.024    0.061  0.595  **  0.245 
ln(Inverse Herfindahl index)  2.324  ***  0.665  1.548  ***  0.554  1.631  ***  0.449  2.445  **  0.998  1.301    0.961 
                                        
obervations  1710  1710  1072  1308  404 
p-values                                          
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments):  0.429  0.507  0.739  0.307  0.138 
Test for Ar(2) residuals  0.045  0.011  0.023  0.01  0.026 
Notes, S.E. = heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, *** (**) (* ) signify significance at the 1% (5) (10%) level respectively. All results based on  
System GMM estimation using a maximum of 2 lags of the independent variables as instruments 
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When, however, focusing on the direct effect of migration on the unemployment rate we 
find that although migration is on average positively correlated with the unemployment 
rate, this effect remains insignificant at all conventional levels of significance.
20 (The t-
values  for  these  para meter  estimates  are  well  below  unity.)  Furthermore,  -leaving 
significance aside  -  also the coefficients imply a rather small impact of migration on 
unemployment rates. The coefficients imply that increasing the net migration rate to a 
region  by  1  percentag e  point  increases  the  unemployment  rate  in  this  region 
insignificantly by around 0.2 per cent (see column 2 in table 3).  
 
This insignificance also applies when we split our migration measure between internal 
and  external  migration  and  also  when  splitting  the  sample  into  immigration  and 
emigration  regions.  In  particular  when  separately  considering  internal  and  foreign 
migrants we find that both these groups of migrants have a statistically insignificant 
effect on the unemployment rate although the point est imates suggest a slightly larger 
positive effect of migration from abroad. Similarly differentiating between immigration 
and emigration regions we find that there are only few differences between the results 
for these two region types. The only difference  to previous results is that some of the 
control variables lose significance in these regressions and that test statistics often 
perform poorly in particular when considering emigration regions. This is, however, due 
to the severe reduction in the size of t he number of observations available for these 
estimates, which  severely reduces the variation in the data and thus complicates the 
identification of effects. 
6.2 Impact on different labour market groups (youth unemployment and long-
term unemployment) 
 
In  sum  thus  our  evidence  suggests  that  migration  had  no  significant  impact  on  the 
convergence  of  unemployment  rates  in  the  years  2000  to  2007  and  that  any  direct 
effects  of  migration  on  regional  unemployment  rates  lack  significance.  As,  however, 
already pointed out in Section 5 these results may mask some important heterogeneity 
in the regional impacts of migration. This may apply to the  impact on different labour 
market  segments. To  address this  issue of  potentially  different  impacts  on  individual 
unemployment  groups  we  thus  reformulate  our  analysis  using  both  the  youth 
unemployment rate as well as the long-term unemployment rate as dependent variables. 
Our hypothesis in this respect is that migrants are likely to compete most severely in the 
labour  market  with  other  persons  entering  the  labour  market.  Therefore  potential 
negative  implications  of  migration  on  unemployment  should  be  more  easily  visible 
among youths, who disproportionately often enter the labour market (see also Winter-
Ebmer  and  Zweimüller,  1999  for  a  similar  argument).  Furthermore  also  long-term 
unemployed  –  who  often  suffer  de-qualification  through  their  prolonged  spell  of 
unemployment  –  may  suffer more than proportionately from increased labour market 
competition, so that they too are more likely to feel any adverse effects of migration than 
the “average” unemployed. 
 
                                                 
20 This insignificance of the unemployment rate is highly robust across different specifications. In 
particular (in results not reported here) we also estimated the specification with other instrumental 
variable techniques as well as without controlling for endogeneity. The only significant results we 
were able to obtain, was a significant negative impact of migration on the unemployment rate in 
uninstrumented equations. This unistrumented specification, as pointed out above, suffers from a 





Table 4: Effect of Migration on Youth unemployment 
 
  
(1) excluding migration  (2) Including migration  (3) seperating 
internal and 
exterlal migration 
(4) only imigration 
regions 
(4) only emigration 
regions 
   Coefficient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E 
ln(long-term unemployment rate) lagged  0.616  **  0.044  0.678     0.052  0.617  ***  0.064  0.646  ***  0.055  0.620  ***  0.143 
net migration rate          8.132    6.058          3.694    5.092  -1.668    5.519 
net internal migration rate                  1.200    7.773               
net migration rate from abroad                  -0.807    2.976             
national population growth  1.104  *  0.619  1.402  **  0.583  0.778  **  0.363  1.053  **  0.548  1.984  *  0.995 
share of young population  0.111  **  5.032  0.114  ***  0.034  0.102  ***  0.217  0.095  ***  0.350  0.147  *  0.798 
shareof low educated  -0.385  **  0.191  -0.469  **  0.197  -0.240  **  0.106  -0.576  ***  0.234  -0.037    0.259 
agriculture share  -0.886    3.175  -1.426    1.995  0.409    1.610  -2.866  *  1.696  2.022    2.058 
Ln(Turbulence index)  0.060  **  0.025  0.047  **  0.021  0.042  **  0.017  0.035    0.027  -0.081    0.068 
ln(compensation per employee)  -0.072    0.267  -0.061    0.195  -0.048    0.142  -0.264    0.228  0.054    0.258 
ln(Inverse Herfindahl index)  0.726    1.557  -0.181    1.016  0.633    0.667  -1.007    1.763  1.966  **  0.856 
                                       
obervations  1704  1704  1055  1305  399 
Tests (P-value)                               
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test 
of all instruments):  0.892      0.287      0.494      0.147      0.145     
Test for Ar(2) residuals  0.082        0.012        0.096        0.058        0.017       
Notes, S.E. = heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, *** (**) (* ) signify significance at the 1% (5) (10%) level respect ively. All results based  on 




Table 5: Effect of Migration on Long-term Unemployment  
 
   (1) excluding migration  (2) Including migration  (3) seperating 
internal and 
exterlal migration 
(4) only imigration 
regions 
(4) only emigration 
regions 
   Coefficient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E 
ln(long-term unemployment rate) lagged  0.399  ***  0.069  0.464  ***  0.088  0.589  ***  0.080  0.549  ***  0.115  0.423  **  0.082 
net imigration rate         0.202  **  0.103          0.365  *  0.218       
net emigration rate                          -0.161    0.158 
net internal migration rate                 0.285    0.178               
net migration rate from abroad                 0.508  **  0.202               
national population growth  1.923  ***  0.778  1.568  **  0.827  1.456  **  0.665  0.201    0.851  1.547    1.387 
share of young population  0,252  ***  0.038  0.229  ***  0.049  0.231  ***  0.035  0.189  **  0.552  0.213  ***  0.063 
shareof low educated  0.297    0.254  0.201    0.263  0.306    0.239  -0.146    0.355  0.448    0.281 
agriculture share  -7.389  ***  2.417  -6.511  **  3.168  -5.533  **  2.837  -4.666    2.996  -3.894    2.642 
Ln(Turbulence index)  0.013    0.028  0.023    0.027  0.003    0.029  -0.019    0.037  -0.031    0.033 
ln(compensation per employee)  1.091  ***  0.328  0.860  **  0.355  1.086  ***  0.262  0.860  *  0.453  0.396    0.343 
ln(Inverse Herfindahl index)  -3.403  **  1.426  -2.767  **  1.355  -2.790  **  1.373  -2.700    2.698  -0.657    1.118 
                                      
obervations  1704  1704  1055  1305  399 
Tests (P-value)                                            
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test 
of all instruments):  0.143  0.219  0.155  0.258  0.213 
Test for Ar(2) residuals  0.089  0.077  0.044  0.327  0.017 
Notes, S.E. = heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, *** (**) (* ) signify significance at the 1% (5) (10%) level respectively. All results based on  




Looking  at  the  results  of  the  specification  for  youth  unemployment  (see  table  4), 
however, reconfirms much of our previous analysis. As with overall unemployment rates 
there are also clear tendencies of convergence with respect to youth unemployment 
rates in Europe in the period from 2000 and 2007 with estimated beta co-efficient lying 
between -0.4 and -0.3. Furthermore, as for total unemployment rates beta coefficients 
are  hardly  influenced  by  controlling  for  migration,  the  minor  changes  that  do  occur 
suggest a moderate decrease when considering the results for youth unemployment, 
only.  This  suggests  only  a  mild  impact  of  migration  on  convergence.  Finally,  again 
similar  to  the  results for  aggregate  unemployment  rate  growth  also  results for  youth 
unemployment rates indicate an insignificant correlation of migration with this component 
of unemployment. Once more these results therefore suggest at most a very mild impact 
of migration on youth unemployment rates. 
 
Results  for  the  long-term  unemployment  rate,  aside  from  suggesting  rather  rapid 
conditional  convergence  in  long-term  unemployment  rates,  with  the  estimated  beta 
coefficients ranging between -0.6 and -0.4, however, indicate that a higher migration to 
an EU region also significantly increases the long-term unemployment rate. This thus 
suggests  that  the  additional  labour  market  competition  of  newly  arriving  migrants 
primarily  works  to  the  detriment  of  the  long-term  unemployed..  According  to  the 
estimated coefficient a 1 percentage point increase in the migration rate  to a region 
increases the long-term unemployment rate by 0.2 per cent. 
 
In addition this statistically significant impact of net migration to a region on long-term 
unemployment is due solely to the impact of migration from abroad (see column (3) of 
table 5). While internal migration has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on the 
long-term  unemployment  rate,  the  coefficient  on  foreign  migration  is  positive  and 
significant. The point  estimate of the coefficient here implies that an increase of the 
migration rate from abroad by 1 percentage point increases the long-term unemployment 
rate by 0.5 per cent. Finally, estimation results for the sample split by emigration and 
immigration regions, on account of a substantially reduced number of observations leads 
to  an  only  marginally  significant  effect  of  migration  on  long-term  unemployment  in 
immigration  regions  only.  Here  higher  immigration  by  1  percentage  point  increases 
unemployment by 0.4 per cent. For emigration regions by contrast the effect remains 
insignificant. This may however, be due to the substantially lower number of observation 
available in this estimate. 
 
6.2 Results for GDP Per Capita Convergence 
 
In  sum  thus  evidence  so  far  implies  an  only  minor  impact  on  migration  on 
unemployment, with the only indication of a statistically significant impact applying to a 
potential increase in long-term unemployment. The results for GDP per capita (reported 
in table 6), however, point in a slightly different direction. They first of all  also imply 
conditional convergence although at a much lower rate than for unemployment among 
the EU NUTS2 regions in our period of observation. The estimated beta coefficient here 
is around -0.1 (but significantly differently from 0) in all specifications except for the case 
where we focus on emigration regions only. 
21 
                                                 
21 Our beta coefficient is thus substantially larger than the famous 2 per cent found by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin  (1991).  The  reason  for  this  is,  however,  that  due  to  controlling  for  region  fixed 
effects and other independent variables we are considering conditional convergence here. When 
we  exclude  these  controls  and  focus  on  unconditional  convergence  only  we  get  a  (highly 
significant) beta coefficient of -0.023 which is close to the annual 2 per cent postulated in most of 
the literature. 31 
 
 










(4) only imigration 
regions 
(4) only emigration 
regions 
   Coefficient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E 
ln(gdp per capita at pps) lagged  0.907  ***  0.026  0.910  ***  0.027  0.925  ***  0.025  0.969  ***  0.040  0.635  **  0.027 
net imigration rate          0.033  ***  0.007          0.023  **  0.012       
net emigration rate                          -0.023  **  0.009 
net internal migration rate                  0.007    0.013               
net migration rate from abroad                  0.014  **  0.006               
investment share in GDP  0.144  ***  0.047  0.140  ***  0.052  0.151  **  0.072  0.141  **  0.058  0.238  **  0.113 
natural population growth  0.032    0.036  0.036    0.042  -0.050    0.049  0.092    0.103  0.321    0.325 
share of young population  -0.994  **  0.288  -0.995  **  0.424  -1.169  **  0.516  0.287    1.160  -3.034    2.649 
shareof highly educated  0.206    0.138  0.202    0.133  0.081    0.095  0.408  ***  0.128  0.958  *  0.559 
agriculture share  -0.231  **  0.116  -0.270  **  0.129  -0.316  **  0.146  -0.026    0.355  -0.624  **  0.303 
Ln(Turbulence index)  0.011  ***  0.003  0.012  ***  0.003  -0.001    0.003  0.013  **  0.005  -0.004    0.013 
                                        
obervations  1712  1712  1072  1308  404 
P-values                                          
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments):  0.334  0.626  0.132  0.777  0.054 
Test for Ar(2) residuals  0.211  0.137  0.330  0.082  0.015 
Notes, S.E. = heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, *** (**) (* ) signify significance at the 1% (5) (10%) level respectively. All results based on  




Also in accordance with the vast majority of the literature, investments have a significant 
positive and the share of young persons (which may be considered a proxy for labour 
supply growth) a significant negative impact on GDP per capita, while natural population 
growth, on account of its co-linearity with the share of young population has no additional 
significant impact. In addition, a low share of agriculture and (in most specifications) a 
more rapid structural change are also conducive of high GDP per capita growth, while 
the share of highly educated has a significant impact on GDP growth only when splitting 
the sample into emigration and immigration regions 
 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  objectives  of  this  paper,  however,  more  importantly 
migration even after controlling for endogeneity has a positive impact on the GDP per 
capita in the receiving region.
22 Here the point estimates of the coefficient suggest that 
an increase in the migration rate by 1 percentage point increases GDP per capita at 
purchasing power by 0.02   per cent. This finding thus corroborates the conclusion of 
much of the literature that on average migration has a weakly positive effect on average 
GDP per capita growth (which could for instance be theoretically explained by the human 
capital gain implied by migration, compl ementary with existing skills and the additional 
regional demand it induces).  
 
When  splitting  the  sample  into  immigration  and  emigration  regions  we  find  that 
immigration has a positive impact in the first case and emigration a negative impact on 
the later regions. In particular a 1   per cent  increase in the net immig ration reate of 
immigration  regions  leads  to  a  0.02   per  cent  increase  in GDP  per  capita  and  in 
emigration regions an equivalent increase in the emigration rate reduces GDP per capita 
by 0.02 per cent. Migration flows therefore tend to increase regional disparities. 
 
Furthermore - also in accordance with previous literature  – the impact of including the 
migration  variable  in  the  GDP  per  capita  equation  hardly  changes  the  convergence 
(beta)  parameter  and  if  anything  increases  rather  than  decreases  this.  In  the 
convergence equation excluding the migration rate this parameter is -0.093, while it is 
slightly larger (-0.090) with migration.  
 
6.3 Results for Productivity Convergence 
 
The effects of migration on GDP per capita can be considered as a combined effect 
including supply and demand side effects of migration. Supply side effects in this respect 
may result from productivity changes due to changes in the skill structure and demand 
side effects from additional demand of migrants. In order to disentangle these effects 
and to provide some evidence on the impact of migration on the competitiveness of 





                                                 
22 Again this result  is highly robust  across different specifications. In particular  (in results not 
reported here) we also estimated the specification with other instrumental variable techniques as 
well as without controlling for endogeneity. In all of the equations the positive co-efficient was 
found.  33 
 
 
Table 6: Convergence in Productivity (Real GDP per employed) 










(5) only emigration 
regions 
   Coefficient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E  Coeffiient  S.E 
ln(productivity) lagged  0.65  ***  0.06  0.65  ***  0.07  0.69  **  0.06  0.66  ***  0.11  0.55  ***  0.12 
net imigration rate          0.02  ***  0.01          0.01  *  0.01       
net emigration rate                          -0.03  **  0.01 
net internal migration rate                  -0.02    0.04               
net migration rate from abroad                  0.02  ***  0.01               
investment share in GDP  0.15  **  0.06  0.15  **  0.07  0.19  **  0.08  0.15  **  0.07  0.23  ***  0.07 
ln(Unemployment rate)  0.07  ***  0.03  0.08  ***  0.03  0.05  ***  0.02  0.07  **  0.03  0.03    0.04 
share of young population  -1.38  **  0.54  -1.36  **  0.56  -1.02  **  0.43  -1.36  **  0.69  -1.36    1.45 
shareof highly educated  -0.27    0.18  -0.32  *  0.17  -0.13    0.14  -0.26  *  0.16  -1.36  **  0.59 
agriculture share  -0.52  **  0.17  -0.51  ***  0.16  -0.52  ***  0.16  -0.50  **  0.23  -0.34    0.29 
Ln(Turbulence index)  0.01    0.00  0.01  *  0.00  0.01  *  0.00  0.01    0.01  0.01    0.01 
                                        
obervations  1712  1796  1055  1308  404 
P-values                                              
Hansen J statistic (overidentification 
test of all instruments):  0.106  0.110  0.166  0.740  0.548 
Test for Ar(2) residuals  0.032  0.022  0.059  0.065  0.009 
Notes, S.E. = heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, *** (**) (* ) signify significance at the 1% (5) (10%) level respectively. All results are System 
GMM using a maximum of 2 lags of the independent variables as instruments 
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Table  6  presents  the  results  of  this regression.  Once more  this regression  points  to 
strong tendencies of productivity convergence among the European NUTS2 regions in 
our observation period. The estimated coefficient on  the lagged productivity level ranges 
between 0.65 and 0.69, in all regressions focusing on the full sample of regions (and 
differs  from  this  only  when  focusing  on  emigration  regions).  This  implies  a  beta 
coefficient  of  -0.30  to  -0.35.  Furthermore,  we  once  more  find  that  the  convergence 
parameter is hardly affected by the inclusion of the net migration rate in our regression. 
Thus migration has only a weak impact on productivity convergence. 
 
As  with  the  GDP  per  capita  convergence,  however,  migration  after  controlling  for 
endogeneity  has  a  positive  impact  on  productivity  in  the  receiving  region.  The  point 
estimates of the coefficient indicate a slightly smaller impact of migration on productivity 
growth than in the case of GDP per capita growth. An increase in the migration rate by 1 
percentage point increases GDP per capita at purchasing power by 0.02 per cent. Once 
more this is primarily due to a significant positive impact of migration from abroad on 
productivity, while the impact of internal migration remains statistically insignificant (but 
also positive). In addition a further division of the sample into emigration and immigration 
regions suggests that this effect is negative in emigration and positive in immigration for 
regions. Emigration regions therefore loose while immigration regions gain skills. 
 
Finally, as already in the GDP per capita growth equation also results for this dependent 
variable imply that a high share of investments in GDP increases, while a high share of 
young population and a high share of agriculture in employment reduces productivity. 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Given  that  immigration  is  faced  by  almost  all  European  countries  and  that  it  can 
potentially affect unemployment and income levels as well as the speed of convergence 
in living standards among regions, which are all major concerns of cohesion policy, this 
study conducted an empirical, econometric analysis covering all EU27 regions in the 
2000-2007  period,  which  is  characterized  by  important  changes  in  the  relevant 
indicators.  
 
First,  we  analyse  to  which  extent  migration  affects  unemployment,  GDP  per  capita 
growth and productivity growth which we consider an indicator for competitiveness of a 
region. In addition, in the case of regional unemployment we also distinguish between 
youth and long-term unemployment. Second we estimate the effects of migration in the 
case of immigration and emigration regions.  
 
Our descriptive evidence suggests that the NUTS2 regions in the period from 2000 to 
2007 converged with respect to per capita income, productivity and unemployment. This 
also applies to the indicators on the structure of unemployment (i.e. youth unemployment 
and long-term unemployment). While regional disparities are large in Europe they thus 
have unambiguously reduced in the last decade. Furthermore, we find that most NUTS2 
regions of the EU were characterised by convergent development in this time period. 
Most of the EU NUTS2 regions were characterised either by income below EU average 
in 2000 and an above average growth rate in 2000-2007 (converging from below) or by 
an above average initial income and below average growth (converging from above). 
The  major  share  of  Eastern  European  regions  and  the  Iberian  Peninsula  were 
converging  from  below.  Only  Southern  Italy,  the  major  part  of  Greece,  several  East 
German  regions,  the  North  of  the  Czech  Republic  and  the  South  of  Hungary  were 
diverging from below. The main share of EU15 was converging from above and a small 35 
 
part of EU15 (Ireland, the North-East of Spain, Cyprus, some regions of Belgium and the 
Netherlands as well as the majority of Finnish regions) were diverging from above. Also 
we find that the majority of NUTS2 regions in the EU were net immigration regions (with 
the  net  emigration  regions  encompassing  almost  all  of  Romania,  the  major  part  of 
Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, the peripheral regions of Sweden and Finland, Southern 
Italy and Northern France).  
 
In  our  econometric  analysis,  we  cannot  find  a significant  impact  of migration  on  the 
regional unemployment rate growth, however, migration has a significant but small effect 
on long-term unemployment rate growth. Our coefficient estimates imply that a 1 per 
cent increase in migration induces a 0.2 per cent increase in long-term unemployment. 
This effect, however, is restricted to immigrant regions, only. 
 
Migration,  however,  has  a  significantly  positive  impact  on  both  GDP  per  capita  and 
productivity growth in immigration regions. The coefficients suggest that a 1 percentage 
point increase in immigration to immigration region increases GDP per capita by about 
0.02 per cent for GDP per capita as well as for productivity. For emigration regions an 
increase in the emigration rate leads to a reduction  of 0.02 per cent in GDP and 0.03 
per cent in productivity.  
 
Finally, our results highlight the differential impacts of different migrants. Due to severe 
data constraints in measuring the structure of migration at the regional level these results 
are less robust and should be interpreted with some care. Nonetheless they indicate that 
the  significant  effect  of  overall  migration  on  long-term  unemployment  rates  arises 
primarily from foreign migrants, For the GDP per capita and productivity growth, we find 
as  well  that  international  migration  is  responsible  for  the  growth  increasing  effect  of 
immigration.  
 
Although  our  data  does  not  permit  us  to  analyse  the  impact  of  different  groups  of 
migrants, our results provide indirect evidence that migration can be viewed as a transfer 
of  human  capital  to  immigration  regions  and  thus  increases  regional  growth  and 
productivity.  Since  immigration  regions  are,  however,  also  often  regions  with  above 
average GDP and productivity while emigration regions in Europe practically all have 
below average GDP, migration seems to induce divergence rather than convergence at 
a regional level. 
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Table A1: Data availability and structural breaks in the European Labour Force Survey 
 
Country  Regions  Years  Breaks due to method  Breaks due to census or definitions 
Austria  9  1995-2008  1999  2004  2003   
Belgium  11  1996-2008  1999    -   
Bulgaria  6  2006-2008  -    -   
Cyprus  1  2000-2008  2004    -   
Czech  8  2002-2008  -    -   
Denmark  1  1995-2008  1999    2007   
Estonia  1  1998-2008  2000    -   
Spain  19  1995-2008  1996  1999  2005  2001 
Finland  5  1999-2008  1998  2000  -   
France  22  1995-2008  2003    2003   
Greece  13  1995-2008  1996  1998  2004   
Hungary  7  2001-2008  2003    -   
Ireland  2  2006-2008  -    -   
Italy  21  2005-2009  -    -   
Lithuania  1  1998-2008  2002    1998   
Luxemburg  1  1995-2008  2003  2007  -   
Latvia  1  2004-2008  -    -   
Malta  1  2005-2008  -    -   
Netherlands  12  1999-2008  2000    2003   
Poland  16  2004-2008  -    -   
Portugal  7  1999-2008  -    -   
Romania  8  2004-2008  -    -   
Slovenia  2  2002-2008  -    -   
Sweden  8  1999-2008  2001    2005   
Slovakia  4  2003-2008  -    -   
UK  37  1999-2008  -    -   





















Table A2: Variable names and sources 
 
Code  Name  Source 
lnurtdi  log growth of unemployment rate    EUROSTAT 
lnurydi  log growth of youth unemployment rate    EUROSTAT 
lntltudi  log growth of long-term unemployment rate    EUROSTAT 
lngdpdi  log growth of GDP per capita (at PPS)  EUROSTAT 
Lnurt  log of total unemployment rate  EUROSTAT 
Lnury  log of youth unemployment rate  EUROSTAT 
Lnltu  log of long-term unemployment rate  EUROSTAT 
Lnnat_ur  log national unemployment rate  EUROSTAT 
Net_mig_r1  Net migration rate in % of total population  EUROSTAT 
net_int_mr 
net internal migration rate in  per cent of total 
population  EUROSTAT 
net_for_mr 
net external migration rate in  per cent of total 
population  EUROSTAT 
nms_mig_r 
change  in  active  aged  foreign  born  from  the 
EU12  in  per cent of active population  ELFS 
old_mig_r 
change  in  active  aged  foreign  born  from  the 
EU15 in  per cent of active population  ELFS 
oth_mig_r 
change  in  active  aged  foreign  born  from  third 
countries  in    per  cent  of  active 
population  ELFS 
low_mig_r 
change in active aged low skilled foreign born in  
per cent of active population  ELFS 
med_mig_r 
change  in  active  aged  medium  skilled  foreign 
born in  per cent of active population  ELFS 
high_mig_r 
change in active aged high skilled foreign born 
in  per cent of active population  ELFS 
Lnyoungsh 
log  of  the  share  of  under  25  year  olds  in 
population  EUROSTAT 
lnlowedsh  log of share of low educated in total work force  EUROSTAT 
lnhighedsh  log of share highly educated in total workforce  EUROSTAT 
natpopgr  log of natural population growth in age 15-65  EUROSTAT 
lnprate 
log  of  economically  active  in  total  population 
aged 15-64  EUROSTAT 
lnagsh 
log of share of aggricultural  employed  in  total 
employment  EUROSTAT 
Lnindsh 
log  of  share  of  industrial  employed  in  total 
employment  EUROSTAT 
lnturb 
Turbulence  index  (share  of  sectoral 
employment  share  changes  in  one 
year)  EUROSTAT 
lnherf_inv 
Inverse  Herfindahl  Index  (Inverse  sum  of 
squares of sector shares)  EUROSTAT 
lncompdi  log of growth of compensation per employee  EUROSTAT 
lnprod  log GDP per employed  CAMBRIDGE ECONOMETRICS 
invest  gross fixed capital formation as share of GDP  EUROSTAT 
 